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Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 19841 amidst great opti-
mism that federal sentencing guidelines would both fulfill Judge Frankel's
reform vision2 and build upon the states' pioneering experiences with sentenc-
ing commissions by avoiding their failures and amplifying their successes. The
statute gave the U.S. Sentencing Commission (Commission) broad authority
to structure sanctions, to permit judges to individualize sentences, to be parsi-
monious in the use of punishment, to use nonprison sentences for nonviolent
first offenders, and to avoid overcrowding federal prisons.
That optimism quickly faded as the Commission began its work, and died
once its guidelines were drafted.' The Commission failed to actualize parts of
its authority and ignored some elements of its own mandate. It dismissed, for
various reasons, the lessons to be learned from states' experiences with guide-
lines systems. Critics of the Commission's work abound, particularly among
federal judges, prosecutors, defenders, and legal scholars.4 Unfortunately, the
brunt of those criticisms has dimmed the chances for new state guideline
initiatives that could be more reasonable and effective.
This Comment argues that the processes by which sentencing guidelines
are developed have important effects on both their content and viability. It
highlights key differences between how the U.S. Sentencing Commission and
the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission went about their appointed
tasks. It concludes by discussing the prospects for redeeming the federal
sentencing guidelines.
Minnesota provides an especially relevant model of sentencing reform.
When the U.S. Sentencing Commission began its work, only Minnesota had
t From 1978 until 1982, Mr. Parent served as the first director of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
Commission, which was the first legislatively created sentencing commission in the nation. Mr. Parent
currently works as a Senior Analyst at Abt Associates, Inc., in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
1. Pub. L No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559, 3561-
3566, 3571-3574, 3581-3586 (1988), and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988)).
2. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WrrHouT ORDER (1973).
3. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1992) [hereinafter
U.S.S.G.].
4. See, e.g., Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on
the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE LJ. 1681 (1992).
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operational guidelines that a legislatively created commission had developed,
implemented, and evaluated Furthermore, Minnesota's success in revising its
sentencing system was well documented: guidelines created more uniform and
proportional sentences than those of the pre-guidelines era; appellate review
fine-tuned and complemented the guidelines: and nonviolent offenders became
more likely to receive community sanctions as punishment, thereby averting
prison crowding and disruption of court workloads. In short, Minnesota's
achievements closely paralleled outcomes Congress sought at the federal level.
The U.S. Sentencing Commission went about its work using processes that
differed in many important respects from those used in Minnesota. It rejected
Minnesota's processes because it disagreed with key values that the Minnesota
commission had adopted in its guidelines. This Comment does not argue that
new sentencing commissions should accept Minnesota's values: what is best
for Minnesota may not be best for Texas, New York, or the federal system.
New sentencing commissions should debate, select, and articulate the values
they will follow in guideline development. But the U.S. Sentencing Commis-
sion's rejection of processes that proved successful in Minnesota adversely
affected the structure and content of the federal guidelines.
Three principles distinguish Minnesota's guideline development from
earlier, judicially developed sentencing guidelines, and from the way in which
the U.S. Sentencing Commission went about its work. First, Minnesota devel-
oped its guidelines through an open process that allowed all affected organiza-
tions and individuals to participate in discussions and to influence Commission
decisionmaking. This practice contrasted sharply with earlier guideline develop-
ment, which had occurred in closed sessions where only judges could partici-
pate. Second, Minnesota's guidelines are openly prescriptive; they implement
normative policies to guide future sentencing, organized around an underlying
philosophy of "just deserts. ' In contrast, Minnesota's previous judicially
5. See MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND
COMMENTARY, reprinted in MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244 app. (West Supp. 1992) [hereinafter MINNESOTA
SENTENCING GUIDELINES]. Washington had only recently implemented its guidelines. See WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 9.94A.010-.910 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992). For a discussion of state analogues at the time the
guidelines were drafted, see Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises
upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 3 (1988). Earlier judicially developed sentencing guidelines
had been voluntary and were considered ineffective by most. See generally WILLIAM D. RICH Er AL,
SENTENCING BY MATHEMATICs: AN EVALUATION OF THE EARLY ATTEMPTS TO DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT
SENTENCING GUIDELINES (1982).
6. See generally MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES CoMM'N, THE IMPACT OF THE MINNESOTA
SENTENCING GUIDELINES: THREE YEAR EVALUATION (1984).
7. The U.S. Sentencing Commission chose a different guidelines enactment process, even though it
knew of the Minnesota experience. Shortly after the federal Commission began its work, I was invited to
brief its members on Minnesota's experiences. In addition, the first director of the federal Commission had
previously served as research director, and later, after my resignation, as director of the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines Commission.
8. The term "just deserts" describes retributive sentences in which the severity of punishment increases
in direct proportion to the seriousness of crimes and the culpability of offenders. See ANDREW VON HIRSCH,
DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENrs 66-76 (1976); see also infra text accompanying notes 26-27.
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developed guidelines were descriptive, purporting to represent past practices
in their structure and content 9 The descriptive guidelines suppressed or elimi-
nated open discussions of purpose or underlying philosophy. The Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines Commission studied past practices but altered them
somewhat to make future sentencing more consistent with a just deserts philoso-
phy.10 In other words, there was no presumption that Minnesota's guidelines
should simply mirror the past. In fact, key elements of Minnesota's guidelines
were selected and defined to emphasize proportional punishment. Third, Minne-
sota's commission interpreted an imprecise statutory directive to mean that its
guidelines had to work without overcrowding the state's prisons." Drafters
of the earlier descriptive guidelines were not concerned about the impact of the
guidelines on prison populations. Similarly, the U.S. Sentencing Commission
ignored a congressional directive to ensure that guidelines would not overcrowd
federal prisons.
12
These three principles--open process, prescriptive guidelines, and recogni-
tion of prison capacity constraints-are considered below. These principles
contributed to Minnesota's fruitful experience with guidelines. In contrast, the
U.S. Sentencing Commission's avoidance of these principles compounded its
problems with guideline development.
I. OPEN PROCESS
During the early stages of the process, the U.S. Sentencing Commission
held numerous hearings around the country to solicit information and opinions
about sentencing policy from judges, prosecutors, defenders, and interested
members of the public. The Commission's later decisionmaking process,
however, was closed to external scrutiny and input. On the other hand, Minne-
sota's Commission used an open process of guideline development, one that
allowed all organizations and interested individuals to participate in the Com-
mission's deliberations and to influence its decisions.
Minnesota's commission viewed guideline development as a political task,
one of formulating public policy to guide officials who sanctioned convicted
criminals. The creation of a guidelines commission merely shifted the politics
of sentencing reform from the legislature to a commission. Its members had
to debate and agree on lofty, and sometimes conflicting, values, including the
9. See infra text accompanying note 18.
10. The Minnesota commission did not want to radically alter the system by prescribing future practices
that radically differed from those of the past. Rather, it made modest changes at the margins to shift
practices toward a just deserts philosophy. Under Minnesota's guidelines system, almost 95% of convicted
felons receive a sentence of prison or probation that is approximately equal to the sentence they would have
received under past practice. Only about five percent of sentences differ from pre-guidelines norms.
11. The enabling legislation directed the Commission to give substantial consideration to available
correctional resources, including, but not limited to, the capacities of prisons and jails. MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 244.09, subd. 5(2) (West Supp. 1992).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) (1988).
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purposes of sentencing and the proper balance between society's demand for
punishment and accused offenders' rights to a fair sentence.
Minnesota's commission also had to face political realities: the guidelines
would be stillborn if a majority of legislators opposed them. The commission
simultaneously had to identify and nurture its supporters and convert or neutral-
ize its critics. To do so, it needed to know who the players were and where
they stood on various issues. It needed a forum in which it could both receive
and convey information. The commission therefore invited all affected interests
and organizations to come before it to be heard and to participate in guideline
development.
The commission's commitment to public participation went beyond the
requirements of Minnesota's Open Meeting Law,13 which mandates that all
discussion and decisionmaking in government agencies occur in public meet-
ings, whose times, dates, and agendas are published in advance. For example,
the commission developed an extensive mailing list of interested organizations
and individuals and sent meeting notices directly to them.
The chairperson, Jan Ingrid Smaby, asked groups unrepresented on the
commission-for example, law enforcement organizations-to designate a
person to attend commission meetings and to act as a liaison between the
commission and the organization. She made similar provisions for groups that
were technically represented but whose needs and interests were not clearly
focused. For example, although one member of the commission was a public
defender, he could not represent the complete range of the defense bar's views.
Unlike county attorneys, who form a well organized and effective lobby,
Minnesota's public defenders are a fragmented and diverse group, and as a
group their positions tend to be less clearly defined. Consequently, Ms. Smaby
asked public defenders in larger counties to attend meetings regularly. Ms.
Smaby also tried to account for groups that, although technically represented
on the commission, maintained disagreements with their chosen representa-
tive.1
4
The commission held most of its meetings in the Minneapolis-St. Paul
metropolitan area, in easily accessible central locations. The commission also
held a series of meetings around the state so that officials and citizens in
outlying areas would have access to the commission.
13. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 471.705 (West 1977).
14. This situation occurred in the Minnesota Department of Corrections (DOC). Although the commis-
sioner of the DOC was also a member of the Sentencing Guidelines Commission, County Corrections
Department officials often felt that the DOC commissioner did not adequately represent their interests.
Although the commissioner administered the Community Corrections Act (CCA) subsidies to counties,
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 401 (West 1977), he also ran the state prison system, which consumed most of the
DOC's funding. Based on their experiences in the 1970's, CCA counties feared that the DOC would support
prisons and pare the CCA in its budget requests. DOC and CCA interests also conflicted on countless
administrative issues important to participating counties. Hence, the Sentencing Commission chairperson
convinced several of the larger county corrections departments to send representatives to the commission's
meetings on a regular basis.
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Ms. Smaby conducted meetings in an informal and collaborative way,
permitting and encouraging members of the audience to participate freely in
the commission's discussions and debates. If deep divisions surfaced on impor-
tant issues, she often extended discussion or postponed decisions until all
persons wanting to comment had the chance to do so, or until a consensus
emerged around an identifiable position.
The open process had several important effects. First, no one could claim
that he or she had been denied the chance to influence the content and develop-
ment of the guidelines. No single group prevailed on all issues; rather, every-
body admitted that they had been treated fairly and acknowledged that the
Commission had heard and weighed their arguments and positions before
making any decisions.
Second, the open process reduced pressure on commission members to act
as vigorous interest group advocates and permitted them, especially on a limited
number of critical issues, to decide what was best for the system as a whole.
For example, the public defender on the commission was not the only person
representing the interests of the defense bar, just as the county attorney on the
commission was not the only prosecutor present to voice prosecutorial interests.
Members adopted less rigid positions and employed less strident rhetoric than
they might otherwise have done if they had been the only advocates for their
constituents' interests. On virtually all tough issues, some of which could have
unraveled the entire effort, commission votes were unanimous.
Third, the open process educated those in attendance. Prosecutors heard a
full discussion of competing values and positions advocated by defenders and
probation officers. Those who attended regularly, a stable cadre of about thirty
participants, slowly came to accept the unwritten ground rule underlying the
process: the commission would try to reach tactical accommodations around
which a consensus could emerge, but it would not abandon the broader values,
such as achieving more proportional punishment, that lent coherence to the
overall effort.
Fourth, the open process had important effects on the form and content of
the guidelines. It became clear, for example, that the guidelines had to be
simple and have "face validity." The commission's quest for simplicity and face
validity affected the way it wrote major sections of the guidelines.
The Minnesota sentencing guidelines have "face validity" for two reasons:
they are based on factors that most people consider critical in sentencing, and
they organize and present information in a way that is immediately illuminating.
The guidelines' essential features are displayed on a single page (a sentencing
grid) that presents the two major dimensions of offense seriousness and prior
record and shows how each affects decisions about imprisonment and sentence
length.15 While the guidelines in toto contain a great deal of more detailed
15. See MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 5, at 413 (reprinting grid).
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information, capturing the essential information on a single page makes sentenc-
ing policies concrete and understandable. 16 Face validity made it much easier
to build political support for the guidelines.
The quest for simplicity affected many decisions about specific guideline
policies. When developing a procedure for scoring offenders' prior criminal
records, the commission sought to draft rules that would be easy to apply, that
could be implemented by officials confronted with imperfect information
systems, and that would work well for the great majority of cases.
In contrast to the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, the U.S.
Sentencing Commission framed its guidelines through a closed process and
adopted official rules of procedure. 17 The decision to insulate the guidelines
from outside input had a considerable negative impact on their substantive
content.
II. PRESCRIPTIVE GUIDELINES
The U.S. Sentencing Commission did not attempt to develop descriptive
guidelines, but neither did it develop prescriptive guidelines. It did not articulate
the purposes that ought to govern future sentencing, and as a result, it could
not structure its guidelines to achieve particular results. From a value-centered
viewpoint, then, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines are adrift. By contrast, the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission selected punishment, implement-
ed under a "just deserts" framework as the guidelines' primary purpose.
Other sentencing commissions could, with justification, select a different
guiding purpose; Minnesota's choice may not be the best for all. But asserting
a purpose imparted a coherence to Minnesota's guidelines that prior efforts had
lacked, and that helped the commission to see components of the guidelines
as part of an integrated whole.
Before Minnesota's efforts began in 1978, sentencing guideline experience
was limited to groups of judges developing guidelines that were descriptive and
voluntary. Under this approach, researchers analyzed data from past sentenc-
16. To be sure, the guidelines required a great deal more information than the grid to make them work.
This information included detailed offense seriousness scales cross-referenced by statutory citations, several
pages of guidelines and commentary on computing criminal history scores, and several pages of rules for
special circumstances, such as consecutive sentencing. Nonetheless, Minnesota's original guidelines and
commentary were less than 40 pages long.
17. While the federal sentencing guidelines were being adopted, I had several conversations with
staffers at the U.S. Sentencing Commission. These conversations confirmed my general impression that the
commission did not employ an open process.
18. Judges were not compelled to follow these guidelines or to report their reasons for ignoring them.
The judicial guidelines' advocates only hoped to curb extreme variations by bringing "outliers" closer to
the mean. Evaluations of such voluntary guidelines, however, found that compliance rates were seldom high
enough to reduce sentencing disparity significantly. In addition, descriptive guidelines often contained wide
ranges of punishments (e.g., 25 to 60 months), so that compliance with the guidelines would merely
perpetuate the variation observed in the empirical research. By contrast, Minnesota's guidelines used
narrower ranges (e.g., 42 to 46 months), so that compliance with the guidelines would reduce the range of
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ing practices and developed empirical models that purported to explain these
practices. Judges used these descriptive models as benchmarks around which
to develop guidelines. The resulting guidelines were voluntary. Judges were not
compelled to consult them when sentencing, and if they gave a sentence that
differed from the applicable guideline, they were not obliged to give reasons.
Descriptive and voluntary guidelines did not create or enlarge the right to
appeal the sentence.
Of course, completely descriptive guidelines would incorporate both good
and bad dimensions of past sentencing. To prevent the codification of bad
practices, judges were supposed to conduct a limited prescriptive review to
remove any elements they found offensive or inappropriate. In practice, howev-
er, judges approached this limited prescriptive review with trepidation. Altering
past practice meant making policy, a responsibility many judges were reluctant
to assume. Judges also lacked the education and training necessary to assess
or challenge empirical models developed by social scientists, and tended to
accept their results as correct, even if the empirical analysis explained relatively
little of the variation in sentencing. As a result, judicially developed guidelines
remained starkly descriptive.
At the time the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission began its
work, criticism of the descriptive model emerged from a small group of schol-
ars.19 They argued that sentencing commissions should prescribe values to
guide future sentencing and structure their guidelines to achieve those values
in practice.20
Several factors supported the development of prescriptive guidelines in
Minnesota. First, the commission was developing guidelines for an entire state,
whereas the descriptive guidelines had previously been applied mainly in large
variation in sentencing. See DON GOTTFREDSON ET AL, GUIDELINES FOR PAROLE AND SENTENCING: A
POLICY CONTROL METHOD (1978); LESLIE WLKINS Sr AL., SENTENCING GIDELINES: STRUCURING
JUDICIAL DISCRETION (1978).
19. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Repressed Issues of Sentencing: Accountability, Predictability,
and Equality in the Era of the Sentencing Commission, 66 GEo. LJ. 975 (1978); Richard Singer, In Favor
of Presumptive Sentences Set by a Sentencing Commission, 5 CRIM. JUST. Q. 88 (1977).
20. For example, John Coffee argued that a prescriptively oriented sentencing commission would, for
the first time, define a microlevel public policy of sentencing, a level at which issues of fairness were
traditionally ill-defined. See Coffee, supra note 19, at 1043. In the past, judges routinely considered
offenders' current and past employment when sentencing, but each judge used different indicators and gave
them variable weight. Coffee thought that sentencing commissions should decide whether to consider
employment at all, and if so, how to measure employment and how much weight to give it in sentencing
decisions, creating a uniform standard for all courts to apply. Id.
"Whether courts should consider employment in calculating sentences depends, in turn, on the purposes
that guide sentencing. If the primary purpose is either to punish or deter, then the employment status and
history of offenders is largely irrelevant. However, if the primary purpose is either to rehabilitate or
incapacitate prisoners, then information on offenders' employment histories might be much more relevant
to sentencing decisions. Data might show, for example, that offenders who are unemployed when they
commit their crimes, or who have long histories of unemployment, are more likely to commit new crimes
in the future.
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metropolitan courts." Because sentencing patterns in different regions might
have differed widely, a statistical average might not have accurately described
sentencing practices in any particular location. Statewide guidelines thus needed
a prescriptive framework. Second, the commission's legislative mandate gave
it authority to make policy. The judges who developed descriptive guidelines
did not have such clear legitimacy and were reluctant to assume it. Third, the
commission derived legitimate prescriptive power from the fact that it was a
representative body. Two authorities, the Governor and the chief justice of the
state supreme court, had chosen its members. The commissioners' mission was
to portray the interests of their respective constituents, while collectively
providing a balanced and systemwide perspective on guideline development.2
Descriptive guidelines characteristically received only judicial input.
Early in its deliberations, the Minnesota commission considered developing
guidelines that encompassed different purposes, without setting priorities among
them. Later, however, members arrived at a unifying purpose, almost by a
process of elimination. The commission determined that the guidelines should
not be based on incapacitation of the offender. In part, this was a practical
concession: the commission wanted guideline development to be informed by
data about current sentencing patterns. In order to incapacitate high-risk offend-
ers, the guidelines would have to predict which groups of offenders were more
or less likely to commit future crimes. The commission could not use data on
current sentencing to predict offenders' future behavior. To predict future
crime, the commission would have had to collect data on the offenses, criminal
histories, and personal characteristics of offenders sentenced several years
earlier and then record their statuses (success or recidivism) after returning to
the community. Such a study would have been expensive and time consuming,
and the commission could not have afforded two separate, large-scale data
collection efforts: one to describe current practice and another to predict
offender outcomes.
The commission also displayed little interest in general deterrence. While
it seems likely that more crime would exist if offenders were not punished, the
commission found no compelling evidence to suggest that punishing selected
offenders more severely would lower crime rates. At the time, rehabilitation
was in disfavor as a sentencing goal.23 The determinate sentencing move-
21. See generally ALFRED BLUMsTEIN Er AL., RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM
138-39 (1983) (discussing descriptive sentencing guidelines in Denver, Chicago, Newark, and several other
cities).
22. The enabling legislation specified that the Commissioner of Corrections would serve on the
Sentencing Guidelines Commission. It directed the Governor to select a defense attorney from a list
submitted by the Minnesota Public Defender and a county prosecutor from a list submitted by the County
Attorneys Association. The chief justice (or his designee) was a member, and the chiefjustice selected two
trial judges to serve. The Governor had a free hand in selecting only the two citizen members. MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 244 (West Supp. 1992).
23. In fact, widespread criticism of the rehabilitative model of penology emerged in the 1970's. For
a general discussion, see BLUMsTEIN ET AL., supra note 21, at 64.
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ment? received much of its support, both nationally and in Minnesota, from
policymakers who believed that coercive treatment did not work.'S Eventually,
the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission settled on punishment as the
unifying purpose around which to develop its guidelines. "Just deserts"
26
served as the framework within which the commission pursued its goal of
punishment.
The principle of just deserts requires punishment to be administered in
proportion to the gravity of the offense and the culpability of the offender. The
harm done determines the gravity of the offense. The offender's intent and her
prior record determine culpability (although some theorists reject consideration
of prior record, arguing that intent alone determines culpability).2 7 Once the
commission selected punishment as a unifying purpose, the crime itself became
the primary factor in determining sentence severity because the Minnesota
criminal code defines crimes in terms of harm done and offender intent. An
offender's criminal record played only a secondary and modifying role; it
merely provided an additional measurement of culpability. Articulating punish-
ment as the primary purpose clarified the two main dimensions of the guide-
lines-the seriousness of the offense and the offender's prior record-and the
relative weight assigned to each.
The commission then decided that in grading offense seriousness, the
guidelines would examine convictions, not alleged offenses.28 It reasoned that
if charges were filed but dropped, or if a defendant asserted her innocence to
charges on which she was never convicted, information about those alleged
crimes should not be used to assess the seriousness of the offense of convic-
tion.29 If the commission had used alleged behavior to assess offense serious-
24. For determinate sentencing arguments, see FRANKEL, supra note 2; VON HIRSCH, supra note 8.
A sentence is determinate if the offender knows, on the date of sentencing, how long he will be confined
under the sentence. A sentence is indeterminate if, after the sentencing, an authority other than the judge
makes decisions about the duration of confinement.
25. Treatment was the primary purpose of indeterminate sentencing. For a general discussion of
indeterminate sentencing, see NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION:
INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM 20-24 (1990). In theory, the parole board
would release an offender at the time it determined the offender had been rehabilitated. Because the parole
board controlled prison releases, critics argued that offenders were coerced into participating in treatment
in order to shorten their prison terms. Id. at 24 ('IFrom a psychological perspective, it defies common
experience to imagine that coerced participation in treatment programs will often facilitate personal growth
and change... [c]oupling participation in treatment programs with a likelihood of earlier release motivated
prisoners to participate, but often it did not motivate them to change.")
26. See VON HIRSCH, supra note 8, at 66-76.
27. See Singer, supra note 19.
28. The commission was troubled by the prospect of sentencing defendants on the basis of crimes for
which they had not been charged, for which charges were dropped, or even for which they had been found
innocent at trial.
29. The commission was aware of the argument that alleged offense sentencing was necessary to allow
judges to offset the increased prosecutorial control that would arise under a sentencing guidelines system.
The guidelines enhance the significance of charging practices. The commission responded that, under
guidelines, prosecutors would exercise their charging discretion with greater responsibility only if the benefits
of the bargains they offered were real and not illusory. As long as the sentencing judge could withdraw
the benefit, prosecutors would be encouraged to play fast and loose with charging. For a thorough discussion
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ness, prosecutors could offer irresistibly lucrative plea bargains, only to move
to have the illusory benefits retracted at sentencing. By opting for conviction
offense sentencing, the Minnesota commission avoided forcing courts to gather
additional facts about uncharged or unproven conduct when scoring offense
seriousness, or to grapple with other difficult issues like determining which
evidentiary standards or burdens of proof should govern. In contrast, the U.S.
Sentencing Commission embraced alleged offense sentencing, thereby greatly
increasing the scope and complexity of the information required to determine
offense seriousness. °
Minnesota's commission, therefore, found all the information it needed to
make approximate judgments about offense seriousness in the statutes defining
crimes.31 The conviction offense determines the offense seriousness level, and
Minnesota's felony statutes enumerate the elements of the offense that must
be proved or the elements to which a defendant has to plead guilty. In addition,
where relevant, Minnesota's criminal code defines separate crimes in which
intent, but not outcome, varies. For example, manslaughter is subdivided into
different statutes, distinguished only by variations in the offender's intent.32
For virtually all crimes, officials applying the sentencing guidelines need to
know only the statutory citation for the conviction offense to determine accu-
rately the guideline's offense seriousness level.
Minnesota's commission divided all felonies (except first-degree murder,
which was excluded from the guidelines by law33) into ten offense seriousness
levels. Within each level, the commission deemed all felonies to be roughly
comparable in seriousness and recommended the same punishment for offenders
with similar prior records. The commission determined that, unless there was
something extremely unusual about a case, the guidelines' sanctions should
hold.
However, the commission recognized that a few cases would contain
"substantial and compelling" elements justifying departure from the guide-
lines.' It permitted judges to use such departures to fine-tune proportionality
in punishment or to assert some goal other than punishment as paramount for
of the advantages and disadvantages of alleged or "real" offense sentencing, see Michael H. Tonry, Real
Offense Sentencing: The Model Sentencing and Corrections Act, 72 L CRIM. L. & CRIMNOLOGY 1550
(1981).
30. See U.S.S.G., supra note 3, ch. I, pt. A, intro. 4(a) (expressing Commission's shift from pure "real
offense" system to mixed system of "real" and "charge offense" sentencing); cf. Breyer, supra note 5, at
11 (noting commission made "compromise" between "real" and "charge" offense system).
31. In four offense categories-theft, theft-related, forgery, and forgery-related crimes-the commission
also believed that the amount of loss was relevant to determining offense severity. Hence, to improve offense
seriousness gradations, it subdivided each of these four types of crimes into two categories: those involving
losses of more than $2,500 and those involving losses of less than $2,500. MINNESOTA SENTENCING
GUIDELINES, supra note 5, at 413-20.
32. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.20-.205 (West Supp. 1992).
33. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.185 (West Supp. 1992); MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra
note 5, at 413.
34. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELIES, supra note 5, at 402.
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the particular case. The goal of punishment also helped the Minnesota commis-
sion define some of the aggravating or mitigating factors that could justify
departures. For example, departure might be appropriate if a property crime
involved an especially large loss, multiple victims, repeated victimization over
an extended period of time, or unusually sophisticated planning.s
While the commission selected punishment as the primary and unifying
purpose, other criminal justice officials and political actors found that the
completed guidelines furthered their own, quite different, purposes. For exam-
ple, sheriffs and police strongly supported a general deterrence policy. While
the commission explicitly rejected this goal, the guidelines increased the
certainty of punishment for violent criminals, drug dealers, and habitual proper-
ty offenders, and increased the severity of punishment for offenders with long
criminal histories. These were the types of crimes and criminals that the police
most wanted to deter. To deterrence advocates, the guidelines looked like an
improvement.
Likewise, those who wanted to incapacitate high-risk offenders also saw
advantages to the guidelines. Under the guidelines, both the frequency and
duration of imprisonment increase with the length of offenders' criminal
histories. Because past criminal behavior is considered to be the best predictor
of future criminal behavior, the guidelines have probably had a discernible,
albeit small, incapacitation effect: those with higher criminal history scores,
who generally have a greater probability of recidivism than those with low
scores, are kept off the streets for longer terms.36
In all of their presentations, commission members and staff stressed that
the guidelines were developed to punish, not to incapacitate or deter. The
commission emphasized that the guidelines' punishment objective was nonutili-
tarian: it did not expect the guidelines to affect either overall crime rates or
individual felons' future behavior. Nonetheless, the commission needed broad
support among criminal justice organizations when the guidelines were submit-
ted for legislative review. If, despite its clear disclaimers, others saw their own
values reflected (even dimly) in the guidelines, the commission welcomed their
support.
35. See Id. at 403-04.
36. Had the commission decided to develop incapacitation-based guidelines (a choice it considered
and ultimately rejected), it would have employed an entirely different method. To accomplish such a task,
a sentencing judge would have to collect data on offender and offense characteristics for persons sentenced
six or seven years earlier. It would then follow those persons for a uniform period of approximately two
or three years after their release from confinement (if any), and collect data on their behavior to measure
recidivism during the followup period. Such a study would also have to analyze these results to identify
the relation of offender or offense factors related to outcomes, and to develop a prediction device that would
have to be validated on a sample of comparable offenders. The prediction device would probably need
revision and reevaluation on a regular basis.
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III. RECOGNITION OF PRISON CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS
The Sentencing Reform Act directed the U.S. Sentencing Commission to
minimize the possibility of crowding in the federal prisons when drafting the
sentencing guidelines.37 The Commission ignored this congressional directive
and developed its guidelines without concern for their effects on prison popula-
tions.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission decided that its guide-
lines should not cause prison populations to exceed ninety-five percent of
capacity.3 8 At the time of this decision, Minnesota's prison population was
at ninety-eight percent of capacity and rising. The use of prison capacity as a
constraint in guideline development was unprecedented. For the first time,
effective coordination of sentencing, correctional, and fiscal policies took place.
Several factors enabled the commission to adopt this position. During the
1970's Minnesota had enacted the Community Corrections Act (CCA),39
which established a legislative policy of nonimprisonment sanctions for property
offenders and gave counties financial incentives to develop additional communi-
ty-based sanctions and services. The legislature enacted the CCA, in part, to
limit the prison population and to avoid the large capital costs of new prison
construction.
In 1977, the Minnesota Department of Corrections (DOC) persuaded a
reluctant legislature to appropriate twenty-three million dollars to build a new
high-security prison. Just one year later, the DOC informed the legislature that
its original cost estimates had been incorrect, and it would need an additional
ten million dollars to complete the facility. Many legislators accused the DOC
of "low-balling" the first estimate to lure supporters and force the legislature
to pay the balance later. In truth, the DOC simply erred badly in its cost
estimates. In any case, in 1978 the legislature made it very clear that it did not
intend to build more prisons in the near future.
Between 1976 and 1978, reform advocates carefully drafted sentencing bills
that would avoid increasing Minnesota's prison population. They chose this
"zero-impact" strategy in order to garner political support from diverse groups
that opposed increased spending for prisons. These groups included advocates
of community corrections who thought that expanded prison funding threatened
CCA subsidies, ° and fiscal conservatives who generally wanted less spending
and who particularly opposed large capital outlays, whether for new prisons,
hospitals, or schools. If a proposed sentencing reform bill would cause the
37. 28 U.S.C. § 994(g) (1988).
38. The Commissioner of Corrections, also a member of the Sentencing Guidelines Commission,
emphasized that prisons need a cushion between population and capacity to provide flexibility in classifica-tion and placement, and to allow officials to repair and maintain the physical plant. Hence, he argued for
a constraint on prison population at less than 100% of capacity.
39. MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 401 (West 1977); see also supra note 14.
40. See supra note 14.
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prison population to exceed capacity, advocates of the bill had to introduce
other amendments to offset the prison population increases.
In the long term, two factors determine prison populations: the number of
offenders admitted and the length of their stays. Guidelines can set policies that
control both factors, and therefore they can set and maintain prison populations
at any level deemed acceptable.4 '
Not everyone thought the commission made the correct decision. Judges,
prosecutors, and police were critical and sometimes derisive of the capacity
constraint concept. When commission staff described capacity constraint to a
statewide judicial conference, one judge suggested that the daily prison popula-
tions should be broadcast each morning along with the livestock reports, so that
judges would know if there was room for newly convicted offenders to go to
prison that day!
2
The commission spent a lot of time justifying its position. Members did
not hold press conferences, but they did discuss the guidelines informally with
criminal justice organizations and civic groups, in radio talk shows, and at
church coffee hours. Commission members and staff attended over one hundred
such gatherings during the year the guidelines were developed. They stressed
the following points:
* The state had an overriding obligation to avoid subjecting incarcer-
ated citizens to unconstitutional conditions of confinement.
* Only the legislature-not the commission---could decide how
many prison beds the state should provide because only the legisla-
ture could allocate the limited public funds, whether for prisons,
education, highways, or health care.
* The commission's proper role was to recommend the most reason-
able use of available prison capacity to the legislature. If the
legislature wanted to change policies affecting sentencing (e.g.,
definitions of crimes, mandatory confinement, changed durations
of confinement), the commission could estimate the impact of
policy changes on correctional resource needs. Armed with that
information, the legislature could then make a more informed
decision about where to spend limited public revenues.
41. Of course, something other than current capacity could be the parameter. Andrew von Hirsch, who
advised the Minnesota commission during its deliberations, argued that Minnesota's use of existing capacity
was acceptable only because the state had a history of low imprisonment rates. Von Hirsch argued that other
states should explicitly determine a prison capacity level. Conceivably, states could draft guidelines that
reduced prison populations. In practice, however, the trend has been the opposite. Both Washington and
Oregon developed guidelines constrained not by existing capacity, but by future prison capacities that would
result from expansion programs already funded by their respective legislatures. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9.94A.040(6)-(7) (West 1988); Kathleen M. Bogan, Constructing Felony Sentencing Guidelines in
an Already Crowded State: Oregon Breaks New Ground, 36 CRIME & DELINQ. 467, 468 (1990).
42. See DALE G. PARENT, STRUCTURING CRIMINAL SENTENcES: THE EVOLUTION OF MINNESOTA'S
SENTENCING GUIDELINES 42 (1988).
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* Decisions rendered by independent officials, each acting without
a microlevel sentencing policy, had resulted in widespread prison
crowding in other jurisdictions. Thus, "blame" for crowding was
diffused across the entire criminal justice system. Under guidelines,
however, crowding would be a conscious policy choice; the com-
mission and the legislature would share responsibility, because they
could choose to avoid crowding. A conscious policy decision to
crowd prisons would be more vulnerable to constitutional chal-
lenge.
" Crowding endangered the guidelines. Some judges, prosecutors,
and defense attorneys would circumvent the guidelines to avoid
crowding. If the commission did not deal with crowding in the first
instance, but later changed the guidelines to counteract this prob-
lem, its amendments would be vulnerable to political attack. Under
Minnesota's formulation of presumptive sentencing, parole release
had been abolished, leaving no safety valve to deal with crowded
prisons.
In order to ensure that its guideline policies would not overcrowd its
prisons, Minnesota had to find new and improved ways to estimate future
prison populations. The commission developed computer models to simulate
the effects of different options for guideline policies.43 Staff members could
give the commission almost immediate feedback on what a particular option
would "cost" or "save" in terms of prison beds. If the simulation showed that
an option selected in one guideline policy would push population above capaci-
ty, the commission would need to select options in later policies that reduced
the prison population by an equal amount
It is important to emphasize that the limits of prison capacity did not drive
the selection of guideline policies. In every instance, basic policies were chosen
for other reasons, usually to advance the goal of proportional and just punish-
ment. However, the commission tested all the policies for prison population
impact and fine-tuned many of them to stay within the capacity limits.
The capacity constraint had important effects on commission decision-
making. All members, as well as nonmembers regularly attending the meetings,
eventually came to view their task as one of distributing punishment under
conditions of scarcity. Imprisonment was not a free public good whose use was
to be maximized; rather, it was a scarce and expensive resource, which had to
be allocated rationally. The commission faced a zero-sum situation when it
drafted the guidelines because Minnesota's prisons were virtually full. If one
43. The commission received a $12,500 grant from the National Institute of Corrections and an equal
amount of state funds to develop a prison population impact simulation model. This model provides quick
and accurate estimates of how different policies under consideration will affect the number and composition
of the prison population over a five-year period. For a complete description of the model, see KAY A. KNAPP
& RONALD E. ANDERSON, MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, MINNESOTA SENTENCING
GuIDELINEs POPULATION PROJECTION PROGRAM USER'S MANUrAL (1981).
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group of offenders received incarceration in lieu of probation or longer prison
terms than in the past, another group would correspondingly receive probation
rather than incarceration or shorter prison terms than in the past.
The capacity constraint was a catalyst for compromise among commission
members whose constituents' interests conflicted. The commission's prosecutor
might prevail on an option that would punish some felons more severely and
cause future prison crowding, but he would then have to concede some other
option favored by the defense attorneys that would bring the projected prison
populations back below the capacity limit. This further forestalled the emer-
gence of rigid interest group advocacy among commission members and
promoted a work ethos stressing tactical accommodation within the framework
of consistent strategic principles.
The capacity constraint disciplined the commission in its allocation of
punishment. Neither individual members nor the commission as a whole could
pander to the public or to a particular constituency by advocating harsher
punishments across the board. Some offense categories could receive harsher
punishments, but other categories would receive lighter ones in order to stay
within capacity limits: tradeoffs were essential. In making those hard choices
concerning the categories of offenders that were most deserving of punishment,
the commission had to make decisions that it could justify publicly.
The capacity constraint, together with the ability to analyze the population
impact of policy options, shielded the commission from political pressure to
toughen sentences for selected offenders during the final guideline drafting. In
the last month before the commission sent the guidelines to the legislature,
prosecutors, victims' rights advocates, and police groups vigorously lobbied the
commission to make sentences more severe for their particular "favorite"
crimes." These collective changes would have pushed prison populations
dramatically above capacity, and would have undermined the proportionality
embodied in the guidelines' penalty structure. Armed with evidence of the
population effects of these revisions, the commission resisted sweeping chang-
es.45
After the guidelines went into effect, the legislature began asking the
commission for "prison population impact statements" on all bills that affected
sentencing. These statements allowed the legislature to make more informed
judgments; if they favored a bill that would drive up prison populations, they
now knew more precisely what it would cost and could then make tough but
44. At the time, the price of silver had risen sharply, and Minnesota was plagued with a steep increase
in residential burglaries. Police, therefore, advocated far tougher sanctions for residential burglaries.
Simultaneously, advocates for sexual assault victims urged the commission to raise penalties for those
convicted of certain criminal sexual conduct offenses.
45. The commission did make several minor adjustments during this period on matters raised by these
advocate groups. These changes generally enhanced the rationality of offense seriousness rankings or
improved the proportionality of punishments.
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informed decisions about whether to enact the bill, and, if so, where to find the
money.
IV. CLOSING THOUGHTS
If the U.S. Sentencing Commission had followed a rational process of
guideline development-by stating its purposes, by acknowledging constraints
within which the guidelines had to function, and by opening its information
flow and decisionmaking processes-it is unlikely that its guidelines would
have strayed so very far from past practice or that they would have been so
complex and rigid. But the federal Commission took an ideological, even
political, approach to guideline development that disavowed constraints, sup-
pressed discussions of purpose, closed decisionmaking to interested and affected
parties, and departed substantially from past sentencing norms.
Even under the best conditions, presumptive sentencing guidelines are
unlikely to win judicial popularity contests. If one had polled Minnesota's
judges during the early years of guideline implementation, most of them
probably would have decried the sudden and strict bounds placed on their
previously unfettered discretion. Yet at the same time, most probably would
have agreed that Minnesota's guidelines had generally produced appropriate
sentences.
Some judicial criticism may be transitional: it takes time for judges to adapt
to a fundamentally new regime. While all cases are different, not all cases are
different in ways that ought to matter when applying a microlevel public policy
of sentencing. Unwarranted disparity occurs not only when judges fail to
distinguish one case from others, but also when the reasons for their distinctions
run contrary to the microlevel public policy of sentencing. The test of success
is not whether judges are happy, but whether reasonable policymakers and
practitioners agree that the criteria used to classify offenders and offenses are
appropriate, and that the penalty structure is fair. The strength, breadth, and
persistence of judicial criticism levied against the federal guidelines points to
the core problem: judges reject the guidelines as appropriate norms to govern
federal sentencing. Judges believe that the guidelines are too severe and that
they shift sentencing outcomes too far from preexisting patterns. Because they
so often disagree with the guidelines' outcomes, many judges want more
flexibility to depart from them.6
If most federal judges thought that the guidelines furthered appropriate
norms, they would find less need to depart from them, and their complaints
about inflexibility would diminish. In order for that to happen, however, the
guidelines need fundamental revision, not fine-tuning. The critical question is
this: can these fundamental revisions take place years after the federal guide-
46. Cf. Freed, supra note 4, at 1685-86 n.10 (citing judicial attacks on federal sentencing guidelines).
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lines have been implemented and integrated into the federal criminal justice
system? This closing section considers different ways in which the federal
sentencing guidelines might be changed and the prospects for their approval.
The most appropriate ways to change flawed guideline policies are through
existing channels of policymaking: the commission's power to revise the
guidelines or the congressional power to reconstitute or abolish the commission.
A. Commission Revision of Its Guidelines.
The U.S. Sentencing Commission could itself, at any time it chooses,
fundamentally revise its guidelines. Fundamental changes in the guidelines
would mean fundamental changes in the values the commission has endorsed,
embodied in the guidelines, and defended against critics. A skeptic could easily
conclude that it is unrealistic to expect the existing commission-wedded as
it is to an ideological approach to guideline development-to suddenly adopt
a rational approach to guideline revision.
B. Congressional Revision of Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Congress could create a new independent sentencing commission and direct
it to revise the work of its predecessor. This would provide a new chance to
learn from the successes and failures of prior federal and state sentencing
commissions. If Congress were to pursue this option, the new commission
should:
1. have its members nominated by a variety of interest groups and
appointed by a variety of authorities, for a better balance of view-
points;
2. consist of trial judges, federal prosecutors and defenders, federal
probation and prison officials, and members of the public;
3. articulate a purpose or purposes to guide future sentencing;
4. operate in the open; and
5. develop capacity-constrained guidelines.
C. Congressional Enactment of a New Sentencing Reform Model
Congress could abort the current sentencing guidelines and seek a new
model of reform. The impetus for uniformity and consistency in federal sentenc-
ing, however, is probably too strong to permit a return to the status quo ex ante.
In the alternative, Congress could seriously reconsider an option proposed and
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rejected when it drafted the Sentencing Reform Act: a dual guideline system.47
Under a dual guideline model, judges would use one set of guidelines to make
sentencing decisions, while a parole board or board of prison terms would use
another to make releasing decisions for those imprisoned. A single body could
develop both sets of guidelines, thus promoting greater consistency between
them, or separate agencies could be authorized to develop each. In either case,
the administrative agencies should adhere to fundamental policies specified by
Congress and be subject to strict congressional oversight
Federal judges would use the sentencing guidelines to determine which
offenders should or should not be imprisoned, while the parole board would
rely on guidelines to set punitive conditions of probation. A parole board or
board of prison terms would rely on separate guidelines to determine the
duration of imprisonment and conditions of postprison supervision. Durations
set by a parole board or board of prison terms could be adjusted later only for
limited exceptional reasons. In addition, the board of prison terms could be
charged with making retroactive adjustments in prison terms for those sentenced
under prior regimes.
In reality, the prospects are bleak for either type of congressional action
to reform federal sentencing. It took Congress a decade to enact the Sentencing
Reform Act Building congressional support for a major guideline revision or
for enactment of new reform models -would be a slow and difficult process.
Congressional leaders who championed sentencing reform in the 1970's and
early 1980's have moved on to other issues. The Commission's initial guide-
lines have sharply altered the exercise of discretion and have shifted the balance
of interests in sentencing. Those who think their authority or latitude will suffer
from major guideline revision or new reform models will vigorously resist
them. Any recommendation to make even some sentences less severe would
be vulnerable to attack as being "soft on crime."
Congress has not recognized its altered role in defining sentencing policy
under presumptive guidelines, and until it does, any congressionally mandated
revision will be imperiled. The Sentencing Reform Act signaled a transition
from symbolic to real sentencing; yet after 1984 Congress enacted scores of
mandatory minimum sentences.4 Neither Congress nor the Commission has
demonstrated discipline or restraint in the allocation of punishment; until they
do, there will be predictable pressure to escalate microlevel sanctions so that
the guidelines cannot work as written. The Commission disregarded the Sen-
47. The United States Parole commission strongly advocated this approach. In 1980, I wrote a letter
proposing the model to Representative Robert . Drinan, who chaired the House Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice. He wrote back a detailed letter with comments and questions on the proposal. It was rejected or
otherwise died at some point during the legislative process.
48. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 7-13 (1991).
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tencing Reform Act's directive on capacity constraints, but Congress did not
hold it accountable for that decision.
D. Revision via Departures
Several thoughtful observers and practitioners favor using departures to
revise the guidelines. 49 Advocates argue that for this system of revision to
work, departures should be encouraged, and high departure rates should be
tolerated during the early years of guideline implementation. Once the guideline
norms shift, then departure rates should be reduced.50 They suggest that
departures could shift guideline norms in two ways: by prompting the Commis-
sion to revise the guidelines or by encouraging emergence of case law as a
separate source of judicial authority.
1. Revision by the Commission in Response to Departures
The Commission, some argue, could analyze departures in terms of frequen-
cy, direction, reasons, and types of cases, and then use these findings as a
foundation for guideline revisions. Departures would serve as a form of commu-
nication between the Commission and the bench. In a sense, judges' departures
would constitute "votes" for amending Commission policies.
Of course, it is not clear that the U.S. Sentencing Commission would
respond to increased departures by amending its guidelines in ways preferred
by judges. In the past, it has sometimes taken the opposite tack, foreclosing
future departures for the very reasons cited by judges.
2. Stimulating Case Law
A common law of sentencing could emerge from contested departures. This
common law would stand alongside the guidelines as a separate source of
judicial authority, whether or not the Commission decided to amend its guide-
lines.
3. The Drawbacks of Departures
Both proposals are seriously flawed. They would undermine-and perhaps
eliminate-the guidelines' ability to reduce sentencing disparity. Understanding
the effects of these proposals requires an examination of how guidelines are
supposed to reduce disparity.
49. See, e.g., Gerald B. Tjoflat, The Untapped Potential for Judicial Discretion Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: Advice for Counsel, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1991, at 4, 5.
50. See Freed, supra note 4, at 1750-51.
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Guidelines sort offenders and offenses into comparable categories and scale
the severity of punishment presumed appropriate for each category. Normatively
acceptable sorting criteria and a consistently applied penalty structure will
greatly reduce disparity. All cases differ, but not in ways that are relevant under
sentencing guidelines. For the great majority of cases, an appropriate sentence
can be determined with a small number of important criteria. Thus, the guide-
lines themselves are the primary means to reduce disparity.
Departures play a secondary and very limited role in reducing disparity.
The primary reason for departures is to achieve more proportional punishments
for the small number of exceptional cases that do not fit into the general norms
embodied in the guidelines and therefore require sentences outside the usual
range. If judges are prodigal in their use of departures, they will increase
disparity by departing when it is not warranted, by departing in the wrong
directions, or by departing by excessive amounts. Departures were never
intended to be a mechanism for fundamentally revising sentencing guidelines.
Other mechanisms, such as public hearings at which constituents can propose
or debate changes, are the more proper way to achieve basic policy reform.
Of course, a sentencing commission could consider departure patterns when
it fine-tunes its guidelines. In Minnesota, for example, the original guidelines
called for probation for every offender convicted of unauthorized use of a motor
vehicle (UUMV),51 regardless of the length of his or her prior record.52
While few offenders convicted of UUMV had very long criminal records,
Minnesota judges departed to imprison almost all of them. Recognizing this,
the commission amended its guideline by making short prison terms presump-
tive for these offenders.5 3
In conclusion, a high departure rate may permanently eliminate any chance
of reducing disparity. Once accustomed to the flexibility accorded by frequent
departures, there is no guarantee that judges will later accede to a lower rate
of deviation from the guidelines.
Case law as a means of achieving fundamental guideline revision is similar-
ly problematic. Case law develops slowly, and the problems caused by the
51. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.52 subd. 2(17) (West Supp. 1992).
52. The commission argued that UUMV, if properly charged, should apply only to joyriding offenses.
If an offender stole a car with intent to deprive the owner of it permanently, the offense should be charged
as a theft, a more serious crime for which the guidelines recommended prison for offenders with moderate
prior records. See PARENT, supra note 42, at 92 & n.5.
53. See MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 5, at 416. In other circumstances, a
commission might resist changing a guideline even in the face of high departure rates. In Minnesota, second-
degree assault involves threatening someone with a dangerous weapon. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.222 (West
Supp. 1992). Minnesota's legislature created a separate sentencing enhancement (mandatory imprisonment
for one year on the first offense) for all crimes committed with a dangerous weapon, to be imposed upon
recommendation of the prosecutor. Id. § 609.11 subds. 4, 6-7 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992). The commission
took the position that a second-degree assault conviction should be punished by a one-year prison term,
reflecting the mandatory minimum for crimes committed with a dangerous weapon. Although judges
departed in over 60% of the second-degree assault convictions involving first offenders, the commission
stood on principle and maintained its policy.
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federal sentencing guidelines may require more immediate solutions. The flow
of information in appellate litigation is more narrow and more filtered than in
an overt policymaking process, such as in a legislative body or an executive
agency with rulemaking authority. A litigant can raise only the issues relevant
to the claim he or she is presenting. While relevance is a flexible criterion, few
litigants are likely to challenge the guidelines in global terms. Most will
challenge only one or two narrow points about the guidelines' rules, interpreta-
tions, or applications. Appellate judges are not likely to inquire how a litigant's
narrow challenge, if upheld, will affect the overall structure or coherence of
the guidelines. Litigants raise issues on a piecemeal basis, yet guideline policies
are interrelated, and a seemingly minor change in one element imposed by a
court decision could have serious effects on other parts of the guidelines that
were not at issue in the litigation.
Finally, there is no guarantee that the doctrines emerging through case law
will improve the operation of the guidelines. They could just as easily make
matters worse. Appellate review may be well suited to chipping away at minor
problems in a fundamentally sound public policy, but it is not a good way to
draft fundamental policy changes.
In summary, if the guidelines' norms need to be changed, they should be
changed by political means, beginning with the Commission's own internal
process for revision and, if that proves unfruitful, by moving to the congressio-
nal arena. Rampant departures are more apt to ruin the guidelines completely
than to achieve even minimally effective reform.
Opponents of determinate sentencing have warned of the perils of exposing
microlevel sentencing policy to direct political influence. Indeterminate sentenc-
es (whatever its defects) tended to insulate case level sentencing from the
passions and vagaries of the political process and seemed to mitigate harsh
penaltiesfr 4 With respect to the federal system, they may have been right. If
Minnesota's legislature passes a sentencing law that will cost forty million
dollars for new prison construction, its members must take the money from
education, health care, libraries, or other important social programs. If Congress
passes mandatory minimums that add hundreds of millions to the cost of federal
prisons, they merely add another drop to an ocean of red ink. Unconstrained
by a sense of discipline, Congress and the Commission have crafted a micro-
level sentencing policy that reflects the nation's fears, not its hopes or even its
best interests. Nonetheless, the experience may have one redeeming value: It
can teach important lessons to state policymakers considering sentencing reform
options, if they will but listen and learn.
54. Commentators have noted that harsh sentences, imposed by political processes, may lead to higher
avoidance rates. As Andrew von Hirsch said: "Writers of sentencing guidelines need, therefore, to be
sensitive to the link between severity and incentive to avoid [harsh sentences]. As the level of sanctions
rises, the difficulties of applying them evenhandedly also increase." Andrew von Hirsch, FederalSentencing
Guidelines: Do They Provide Principled Guidance?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 367, 375 (1989).
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